The integration of an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system is generally deemed to improve the fluidity of the order-process cycle. In other words, ERP allows for improved assimilation of all processes inherent within the business. Whilst the rationale for ERP implementation can be substantiated in reference to a variety of factors, we believe that the following three were most vital in the Geneva Pharmaceuticals case:
• Rivals’ products can be used interchangeably
• Need for ‘on-demand’ supply function
• Manufacturing is scientific and requires high levels of cohesion between processes.
As generic drugs are indistinguishable in terms of composition, it is vital that Geneva is able to supply retailers/consumers at a competitive price within a sufficient time-span. Moreover, increased transparency in the amount of surplus output would allow Geneva to take advantage of the emerging internet market for generic drugs. Owing to this realisation, the first two key points are interlinked: if Geneva is to attain a reasonable market share, it must be able to satisfy orders promptly. As previously insinuated, ERP’s ability to improve cohesion between different departments was a fundamental factor in Geneva’s decision to implement the system. The benefits of ERP implementation are related to the complexity of operations- as Geneva’s processes are “scientific, controlled and highly precise”, their mangers evidently deduced that the integration benefits of ERP would allow for greater consistency in production and more stringent monitoring of operations.
Without question, implementation of ERP is a complex and often prolonged process. In order to ensure that operation disruption is minimised, Geneva were faced with several dilemmas. In our opinion, their initial choice of consultancy firm, Whitman-Hart (WH), was a contributing factor to the problems experienced during the first phase of implementation. Granted, WH had prior experience of R/3 execution. However, their distinct lack of familiarity within the pharmaceuticals industry perhaps meant that a significant proportion of their time would have been allocated to discussing a course of best practice whenever a contentious issue was discovered; had Geneva chosen a firm with both technical knowledge and relevant experience, such discussion would not have been necessary. Furthermore, the selection of a more experienced consultancy firm would enhance the competitive advantage gained through ERP implementation; had Geneva been able to hire a firm previously employed by a rival manufacturer, they may have been able to gain an insight into the manner in which their competitors integrate their systems.
According to Somers and Nelson (2001)[1], the most critical factor in determining the success of ERP implementation is the extent to which management staff support the process. By encouraging employees to embrace the fact that their traditional job roles were changing, Geneva was able to ensure that staff were fully committed to the transitional process. Hence, employees developed a clearer understanding of their responsibilities and consequently were able to give a more accurate insight into the detrimental effects of the old system. Without question, this decision is underpinned by the ‘people before process’ mantra inherent within most successful implementations of ERP.
The transition to an ERP system is significant, for any business, in terms of cost, time scale and a change in the overall structure and organisation of departments. The benefits associated with this revolutionary business model are also of a similar scale and are rarely ever achieved as smoothly as proposed during the planning stages. Implementations of ERP have been initiated by many well renowned organisations to widely varying degrees of success. While ERP remains in its infancy, there is much still to be learned regarding how to consistently implant the technology within the business environment.
As may be expected the majority of the issues were encountered during the initial stages; as explained above, the root cause could be traced back to the limitations of the consultancy firm, Whitman Hart.
“SAP’s rapid implementation methodology called Accelerated SAP (ASAP) was selected for deployment, because it promised a short implementation
cycle of only six months!”
Whilst this group were technically proficient, the above statement demonstrates their naivety of the business context. This deficiency severely hindered the progress of Geneva’s ERP system, where little had been achieved four months since the inception of the project. This may seem totally unacceptable but precedent tells us that the application of ERP is not a speedy process, “54% take longer than 2 years to completion”[2]. Contrary to the WH “ASAP methodology”, it was this lack of foresight that encouraged many of the failings of phase 1.
Installation was not differentiated from implementation; little regard was paid to the specific requirements of Geneva. What WH had produced did not fulfil the needs of the corporation. To combat this, ERP guru Randy Weldon was employed to direct further proceedings. His experience had taught him “ERP was fundamentally about people and process”.
The approach to stages 2 and 3 were markedly different to that which WH had pursued- the haste to complete the project was replaced with an unsparing commitment to the development of a useful end product. The diminishment of constraints allowed the remainder of the implementation to flow in a more frictionless manner. The Y2K deadline was given less significance, the project was granted as much time as it required. Staff were also encouraged to buy in to the changes by more proactive training schedules. Focusing on how their role would evolve with the system and less concerning the system itself.
The introduction of ERP was treated less as a new software package and more applicably as a colossal culture change for the firm. ERP instils a complete interdependency between the segments of an organization. As the data is centralized, each subsequent department in the chain is reliant upon the accurate input from a previous division. It is essential that employees uphold the integrity of the system. Geneva’s gradual acknowledgement of this facet is evidence from the text. During the preliminary discussion, preceding phase two, much greater involvement was encouraged from the key users. They were given increased opportunity to raise concerns and suggest improvements enabling further progress in a much more cooperative and social fashion. This is the main discovery from the case and is substantiated by the findings from previous implementations of the technology. Successful incorporation is obtained only where the system is unequivocally adopted throughout the entire organization.
References
[1] H. Akkermans and K. van Helden, "Vicious and virtual cycles in ERP implementation: a case study of interrelations between critical success factors", www.palgrave-journals.com/ejis/journal/v11/n1/pdf/3000418a.pdf
[2] Christopher Koch, "The ABC’s of ERP", http://www.cio.com/research/erp/edit/erpbasics.html
Additional Reading
Ben Worthen, "Nestle’s ERP Odyssey", CIO Magazine, 2002
Christopher Koch, "When Bad Things Happen to Good Projects", CIO Magazine, 2004